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Pre-Litigation Contractual Waivers of the
Right to a Jury Trial Are Unenforceable
Under Georgia Law

In a recent decision, Bank South v. Howard,' the Georgia Supreme
Court held pre-litigation contractual waivers of the right to a jury trial
are unenforceable in Georgia! This decision is particularly interesting
in light of two factors: (1) of the jurisdictions considering this issue,
Georgia is the only one to hold such waivers unenforceable; and (2)
contractual arbitration agreements, which essentially waive the right to
a jury trial, are enforceable in Georgia. In Bank South v. Howard, Bank
South filed suit against Howard to recover over two million dollars under
1985 and 1988 guaranties.' Howard raised several defenses and also
counter-claimed against Bank South for fraud and violation of the
Georgia RICO Act. The 1988 guaranty contained an express provision
waiving the right to a jury trial in any action on the guaranty. Despite
the waiver clause, Howard demanded a jury trial. The trial court denied
his demand. Howard appealed, arguing that the jury trial waiver
provision was void because the guaranty was fraudulently induced, and
because the waiver did not specifically apply to his counter-claim against
Bank South.4 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision, holding the provision in the guaranty waiving the right to a
jury trial unenforceable against Howard.5 The court of appeals stated
that Georgia's Civil Practice Act,6 which requires a jury trial except
when a party by written stipulation consents to a non-jury trial, implies
the waiver must be knowing and voluntary.7 The court of appeals held
Howard could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a

1. 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
2. Id. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
3. 209 Ga. App. 407, 408, 433 S.E.2d 625, 626 (1993), affd, 264 Ga. 339, 444 S.E.2d
799 (1994).
4. 209 Ga. App. 407,408,433 S.E.2d 625,626(1993), affd, 264 Ga. 339,444 S.E.2d 799
(1994).
5. 209 Ga. App. at 410-11, 433 S.E.2d at 628.
6. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-1-1 to 9-15-14 (1993).
7. 209 Ga. App. at 410, 433 S.E.2d at 628; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-39 (1993).
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jury trial when he signed the guaranty, because he was not then aware
of the basis and circumstances surrounding a future claim on the
guaranty." Bank South appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether a pre-litigation contractual waiver of the
right to a jury trial is enforceable under the laws of Georgia. 9 The
supreme court held that since such waivers are not provided for by
Georgia's Constitution or Code, they are unenforceable in cases tried
under the laws of Georgia."0 In Georgia, pre-litigation contractual
waivers of the right to a jury trial are unenforceable."
The Constitution of Georgia provides: "The right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, except that the court shall render judgment without
the verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable defense is filed
and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either party."12 The
phrase "shall remain inviolate" refers to the right to a jury trial as it
existed at common law at the time of incorporation of this provision into
Georgia's Constitution. Thus, the right to a jury trial, as it existed in
England, should be inviolate or unaltered.' This right is also codified
in Georgia's Civil Practice Act 1 ' which states: "The right of trial by jury
as declared by the Constitution of the state or as given by a statute of
the state shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."18 However, this
right may be waived expressly or impliedly.'8 Parties or their attorneys
can waive the right to a jury trial "by written stipulation filed with the
court, or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the
record."17 Voluntary participation in a non-jury trial results in an
implied waiver of the right.1 8 In Raintree Farms, Inc. v. Stripping

8. 209 Ga. at 410, 433 S.E.2d at 628; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-39 (1993).
9. 264 Ga. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 799.
10. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 800.
11. Id.
12. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 11(a).
13. Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 852, 193 S.E. 757, 760 (1937).
14. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-1.1 to 9-15-14 (1993).
15. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-38 (1993).
16. Howard v. Bank South, 209 Ga. App. at 410, 433 S.E.2d at 627. See also Phillips
v. Meadow Garden Hosp., Inc. 139 Ga. App. 541, 544, 228 S.E.2d 714, 716 (1976).
17. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-39(a) (1993).
18. 209 Ga. App. at 410, 433 S.E.2d at 627. In Redding v. Commonwealth of America,
Inc., 143 Ga. App. 215, 237 S.E.2d 689 (1977), the court of appeals held participation in a
bench trial did not waive the right to a jury trial where there was no oral consent to a
bench trial in the record, since Code Ann. § 81A-139 (now codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-39)
requires consent to a non-jury trial by written stipulation filed with the court or oral
stipulation made in open court and entered in the record. Id. at 216, 237 S.E.2d at 689-90.
However, in Holloman v. Holloman, 228 Ga. 246, 184 S.E.2d 653 (1971), the Georgia
Supreme Court held a party may waive the right to a jury trial, even though a demand has
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Center, Ltd.,"9 a local court rule provided a party who fails to file a
demand for a jury trial by the last business day before docket call is
The court of
presumed to have waived the right to a jury trial.'
appeals held the local rule was void to the extent it conflicted with the
express waiver requirement in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. section
9-11-39.1 The local rule conflicted with the Civil Practice Act because
it required a pretrial demand for jury trial, whereas the Civil Practice
Act provides for a jury trial as a matter of right unless the parties
consent to a non-jury trial.' Consent to a non-jury trial must be by
express stipulation or by voluntary participation in a bench trial.' In
Manderson & Associates, Inc. v. Gore,' the court of appeals upheld a
jury trial waiver provision contained in an employment and stock
transfer agreement.'
However, the court did so under the laws of
Alabama, since the agreement also contained an Alabama choice of law
provision.26 The court stated that in Georgia "waiver of jury trials is
statutorily recognized, although carefully controlled,, under the laws of
this state. 27
The Georgia Supreme Court based its decision in Bank South v.
Howard on the Georgia Constitution, article I, section 1, paragraph 11
and on O.C.G.A. section 9-11-39(a). 28 The court determined that the
terms of the Constitution and of the statute clearly envision the
pendency of litigation at the time of the waiver.' The Constitution

been made, where voluntary actions negate the demand. Id. at 247, 184 S.E.2d at 654.

Then, in Wise, Simpson, Aiken &Assocs., Inc. v. Rosser White Hobbs Davidson McClellan
Kelly, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 789, 247 S.E.2d 479 (1978), the court of appeals, recognizing the
right to a jury trial can be impliedly waived, stated, insofar as its decision in Redding may
be construed to stand for the proposition that a party can voluntarily participate in a bench
trial, without demanding a jury trial or objecting to the trial court's rendering judgment
on the merits, and then have the unfavorable judgment on the merits set aside because no
jury trial was had, the decision must yield to the supreme court's decision in Holloman.
Id. at 795-96, 247 S.E.2d at 483-84. See also Servisco, Inc. v. R.B.M. of Atlanta, Inc., 147
Ga. App. 671, 672, 250 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1978) (holding active participation in a non-jury trial
without demanding a jury trial until after adverse judgment on the merits has been
entered, constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury trial).
19. 166 Ga. App. 848, 305 S.E.2d 660 (1983).
20. Id. at 848, 305 S.E.2d at 661.
21. Id. at 849, 305 S.E.2d at 661-62.
22. Id., 305 S.E.2d at 662.
23. Id.
24. 193 Ga. App. 723, 389 S.E.2d 251 (1989).
25. Id. at 729-30, 389 S.E.2d at 257-58.
26. Id. at 730, 389 S.E.2d at 257-58.
27. Id., 389 S.E.2d at 257; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-39(a).
28. 264 Ga. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
29. Id.
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explicitly provides two circumstances in which the right may be waived:
when no issuable defense is filed and when the parties fail to demand a
jury trial."0 The statute provides for waiver by express stipulation,
either written or oral. 1 In support of its decision, the supreme court
analogized the waiver of a jury trial to a confession of judgment: 2 both
involve giving up valuable rights, and both are governed by statutes
which, by their terms, contemplate the pendency of litigation.3 As to
both acts, the court of appeals has held foreign judgments based on prelitigation contractual provisions are not contrary to the public policy or
laws of Georgia.' 4 However, waiver of a jury trial and confession of
judgment differ in that the Georgia Supreme Court has held a confession
of judgment must arise after litigation is initiated to be enforceable,
while it has been silent concerning pre-litigation jury trial waivers.'
The supreme court stated that the same rule should apply to jury trial
waivers, due to the importance of the rights involved and the likelihood
of abuse which exists in both situations.'
This decision seemingly
conflicts with Georgia cases upholding the enforcement of contractual
arbitration provisions.37
However, the supreme court explicitly

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Confession of judgment refers to the "act of the defendant whereby he admits or
confesses the right of the plaintiff to take judgment against him, and not to the entering
up, or rendition of, the judgment itself which is rendered upon the defendant's confession
of judgment." Thomas v. Bloodworth, 44 Ga. App. 44, 46 160 S.E. 709, 711 (1931).
Pendency of a valid action, which requires the court to have jurisdiction of the parties, is
a prerequisite to a confession of judgment by either party. Wade v. Combined Mut.
Casualty Co. of Chicago, 201 Ga. 318, 321, 39 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1946). At common law, a
confession ofjudgment was one made in an action after it was begun, and not a confession
made before the action was commenced. Information Buying Co. v. Miller, 173 Ga. 786,
791, 161 S.E. 617, 620 (1931). The confession "amounts to no more than an admission of
indebtedness, and an agreement to take judgment thereon when it can properly be
rendered." Id. at 791, 161 S.E. at 620.
33. 264 Ga. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 840.
34. Id. See Melnick v. Bank of Highwood, 151 Ga. App. 261,259 S.E.2d 667 (1979),(for
confessions of judgment); Manderson & Assocs. v. Gore, 193 Ga. App. 723, 389 S.E.2d 251
(1989) (for jury trial waivers).
35. 264 Ga. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 800. See Information Buying Co. v. Miller, 173 Ga.
786, 161 S.E. 617 (1931). In Information Buying Co. the court held a confession of
judgment is a substitute for a verdict, and no confession of judgment, made before a suit
is filed, can be entered in an action commenced after the confession is made, and no valid
judgment can be rendered upon such confession so made and entered. Id. at 791, 161 S.E.
at 619. To be valid, a confession ofjudgment must be made in an action after it has been
instituted in a court of law. Id.
36. 264 Ga. at 340, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
37. See Weyant v. MacIntyre, 211 Ga. App. 281, 438 S.E.2d 640 (1993). The court held
that where the parties agree in writing to arbitrate, they are bound by O.C.GA. § 9-9-2
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reserved this issue for the General Assembly to reconcile."8 The court
stated that the General Assembly has expressly approved arbitration
contractual provisions by repealing the common-law arbitration and
construction contract arbitration statutes, and by enacting the Georgia
Arbitration Code.' In the absence of similar legislative action allowing
contractual provisions for waivers of jury trial or confessions of
judgment, the court declined to hold otherwise.' Thus, unless and
until the General Assembly enacts legislation allowing contractual
waivers of the right to a jury trial, the Georgia courts will continue to
hold such provisions unenforceable under the laws of Georgia. In her
dissenting opinion, Justice Sears-Collins found an ambiguity created by
the silence of the Georgia Constitution, article I, section 1, paragraph 11
and O.C.G.A. section 9-11-39, since the provisions do not provide that
their methods of waiver are exclusive.41 Justice Sears-Collins believes
this ambiguity should be resolved by upholding the right to contract for
such waivers.4 2 In support, Justice Sears-Collins emphasized the
43
parties' freedom to contract as to any terms and any subject matter.
The court of appeals has held any "impairment of the [right to contract]
must be specifically expressed or necessarily implied by the legislature
Since neither
in a statutory prohibition and not left to speculation.'
Article I, section 1, paragraph 11 nor section 9-11-39 explicitly or
implicitly impairs the right to contract for pre-litigation jury trial
The
waivers, they should not be construed to impair that right.'

and § 9-9-3. Id. at 282, 438 S.E.2d at 642. In enacting the Georgia Arbitration Code, the
General Assembly intended to extend enforcement of arbitration in Georgia from construction contracts to all contracts in which the parties have agreed to arbitration in a written

agreement. Id.; 1988 Ga. Laws 903.
38. 264 Ga. at 341, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
39. Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-1 to 9-9-83 (Supp. 1994). O.C.G.A. § 9-9-3 provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit any controversy thereafter arising to
arbitration is enforceable without regard to the justiciable character of the
controversy and confers jurisdiction on the courts of the state to enforce it and to
enter judgment on an award.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-3 (Supp. 1994).

40. 264 Ga. at 341, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
41. 264 Ga. at 341, 444 S.E.2d at 801 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. See Duffett v. E & W Properties, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 484, 487, 430 S.E.2d 858,

960 (1993) (stating that "[p]arties are free, except as prohibited by statute or public policy,
to contract on any terms and about any subject matter they so desire").
44. 264 Ga. at 341, 444 S.E.2d at 801 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting) (quoting
Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 603, 275 S.E.2d 163, 164 (1980), affd, 248
Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

45. 264 Ga. at 341, 444 S.E.2d at 801 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting).
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dissent also found the majority's analogy of confession of judgment and
waiver of jury trial inappropriate, since confession of judgment is "the
substitute for a verdict" which cannot be taken away until suit is filed;
whereas, the right to a jury trial is not a substitute for a verdict and
therefore, the reasoning of Information Buying Co. v. Millero is not
applicable in this case."' Confessions of judgment and jury trial
waivers differ significantly because a confession of judgment is decisive
of the case, ending litigation of the controversy; whereas, a waiver of the
right to a jury trial is not conclusive but merely limits litigation of the
issue to a non-jury trial.
The majority of courts considering this issue have held pre-litigation
waivers of the right to a jury trial are valid and enforceable.4 In
GaylordDepartmentStores ofAlabama, Inc. v. Stephens,49 the Alabama
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a jury trial waiver
provision contained in a contract between a pharmacist and a department store was enforceable.' In accordance with a number of jurisdictions, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and
Ohio, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld pre-litigation contractual
waivers of the right to a jury trial as enforceable.5 1 However, the court
held the waiver in question was not enforceable where it appeared in
boiler plate language, buried in paragraph thirty-six, and where the
equality of the bargaining power of the parties was questionable.52 The
court followed the general rule: the right to a jury trial is a fundamental
and important one, and therefore, contractual waiver of this right will
be strictly construed.' The waiver must be clear and explicit, leaving

46. 173 Ga. 786, 161 S.E. 617 (1931).
47. 264 Ga. at 342, 444 S.E.2d at 801-02 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting) (quoting
Information Buying Co. v. Miller, 173 Ga. at 791, 161 S.E. at 619).
48. 264 Ga. at 342, 444 S.E.2d at 801 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting). See Telum, Inc.
v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1988); Gaylord Dep't Stores of Ala.,
Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1981); Nowey v. Kravitz, 51 A.2d 495 (Conn. 1947);
Central Inv. Assocs., Inc. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 362 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Edsaid Realty
Corp. v. Samuels, 92 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. City Court 1949); Union Commerce Bank v.
Kimbro, 162 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio 1959); Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Sargoy, 214 S.E.2d
131 (Va. 1975); 73 A.L.R.2d 1332, 1333 (1960).
49. 404 So. 2d 586 (Ala. 1981).
50. Id. at 587.
51. Id. at 588.
52. Id.
53. Id. See Edsaid Realty Corp. v. Samuels, 92 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. City Court 1949);
National Equip. Rental, Ltd., v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding a
presumption exists against contractual jury trial waivers. The right to a jury trial can only
be relinquished knowingly and intentionally. Contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial
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no room for doubt as to the intention of the parties." In Telum, Inc.
v. E.F Hutton Credit Corp.," the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the waiver of a jury trial contained in a lease agreement under
federal law.' The court stated that agreements waiving the right to
trial by jury are enforceable and are not illegal nor contrary to public
policy. 7 In Telum, the appellant contended the waiver should be
invalidated on the ground of fraud in the inducement as to the whole
contract.58 The appellant argued by analogy for the court to accept
federal cases which have held fraud in the inducement may suspend the
enforceability of contract arbitration clauses. 9 The court stated,
although fraud in the inducement relating specifically to an arbitration
provision may invalidate the provision, allegations of fraud in the
inducement going to the entire contract generally have been held not to
affect an arbitration agreement provision." Furthermore, this analogy
of contractual arbitration clauses and waivers of the right to a jury trial
was especially important to the court because "arbitration involves a
greater compromise of procedural protections than does the waiver of the
right to trial by jury. 6 1 Therefore, the court held fraud in the inducement as to the whole contract generally did not invalidate the jury
waiver provision, in light of the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of contract arbitration clauses." In several of the jurisdictions
upholding contractual jury trial waivers, the right to a jury trial is
waived in any action unless a timely demand is made. Thus, the right

was held ineffective where the clause was buried deeply and inconspicuously in the
contract and where there was gross inequality in bargaining power between the parties).
54. 404 So. 2d at 588. See Edsaid Realty Corp. v. Samuels, 912 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
55. 859 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 837. See also Simler v. Conner, 372, U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam) (right
to jury trial controlled by federal law to insure uniformity in exercise required by the
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution).
57. 859 F.2d at 837. See McCarthy v. Wynne, 126 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1942)
(holding that agreements waiving the right to a jury trial are neither illegal nor contrary
to public policy); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
that right to a jury trial, although fundamental, may be knowingly and intentionally
waived by contract); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985)
(parties to a contract may by prior written agreement waive the right to a jury trial).
58. 859 F.2d at 837.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 838. See Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 19710
(N[a]rbitration differs radically from litigation, and one who chooses it must be content with
its informalities and looser approximations as to the enforcement of their rights").
62. 859 F.2d at 838.
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to a jury trial may also be waived by contract.' However, in Georgia
a party does not waive the right to a jury trial by failing to demand a
jury trial; a jury trial is a matter of right unless the parties consent to
a non-jury trial by express stipulation before the court or by voluntary
participation in a bench trial." Although Georgia law also favors
contractual arbitration clauses, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to
treat jury trial waivers similarly, even though arbitration provides less
procedural protection than a bench trial. This decision, though, seems
consistent with the court's historical protection of the judicial process.
Before the 1988 amendment to the Georgia Arbitration Code, Georgia
courts were reluctant to enforce contractual arbitration clauses because
they allowed the "astute party to oust the courts ofjurisdiction. By first
making the contract and then declaring who should construe it, the
strong could oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify the law as to
secure the enforcement of contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or
contrary to public, policy."
In amending the Arbitration Code, the
General Assembly established the public policy of Georgia regarding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, thus, rescinding case law which
refused to enforce contractual arbitration provisions." Similarly, the
Georgia courts will not enforce contractual jury trial waivers to protect
the right to a jury trial which is constitutionally protected and provided
for as a matter of right by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-39. Perhaps the
difference in treatment between arbitration and jury trial provisions
might also be justified by the types of agreements which contain these
provisions. Jury trial waivers are often included in lease agreements,
promissory notes, and guaranties where a higher potential for inequality
of bargaining power exists and which involve parties to whom a jury
might be more sympathetic towards the plaintiff. The Georgia Supreme
Court has left any inconsistency between arbitration provisions and jury
trial waivers to the General Assembly to change. The supreme court's
decision in Bank South could possibly lead to more arbitration resolution
in contractual disputes if parties who have previously used jury trial
waiver provisions in their contracts, replace the unenforceable provision
with arbitration provisions. However, parties may be reluctant since
arbitration involves giving up the whole judicial process, rather than just

63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b); Nowey v. Kravitz, 51 A.2d at 495-96; Chase Commercial
Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d at 707-08.
64. Raintree Farms, Inc. v. Stripping Center, Ltd., 166 Ga. App. at 849, 305 S.E.2d at
662.
65. Freeman v. C.W. Redfern Enterprises, Inc., 182 Ga. App. 205, 206, 355 S.E.2d 79,
81 (1987) (quoting Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98, 101, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (1904)).
66. Weyant v. MacIntyre, 211 Ga. App. at 282, 438 S.E.2d at 642.
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the right to a jury trial. Given the inconsistency of enforcement between
contractual jury trial waivers and arbitration provisions, the number of
jurisdictions that have upheld jury trial waivers as enforceable, and
Georgia law which supports freedom to contract, the General Assembly
might be inclined to address this issue and overturn the court's decision
in Bank South through legislation. Unless the General Assembly
explicitly establishes the public policy of Georgia regarding the
enforceability of pre-litigation contractual waivers of the right to a jury
trial, such waivers will remain unenforceable under the laws of Georgia.
E. MICHELLE ROBINSON

